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Introduction
The human trafficking problem has worsened in many countries. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) states that "a conservative estimate of the crime puts the number of victims at any one time at 2.5 million…it affects every region of the world and generates tens of billions of dollars in profits for criminals each year." The results show, for example, that democracies and countries that combat corruption have implemented strict anti-trafficking policies.
A pertinent question is who the victims and culprits of human trafficking are. The UNDOC states that "victims of trafficking can be any age, and any gender. However, a disproportionate number of women are involved in human trafficking both as victims and as culprits." 4 Because many of the victims are women and combatting human trafficking reinforces human rights, cultural traits and religion are likely to influence policies against human trafficking. Religion has been shown to influence human development and economic policy-making. Religion influences, for 2 (http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/humantrafficking/faqs.html#Who_are_the_victims_and_culprits_of_human_trafficki ng -accessed on July 22, 2012). 3 Akee et al. (2010) examine how ethnic fragmentation and conflict influence human trafficking. Using micro-data from Eastern Europe, Omar Mahmoud and Trebesch (2010) show that individual trafficking risks are much higher in regions with large emigration flows. 4 (http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/humantrafficking/faqs -accessed on July 22, 2012).
example, gender equality: in the education system and the labor market, discrimination against women is quite prevalent in countries with Muslim majorities. By contrast, discrimination against women is less pronounced in countries with Christian majorities. I review the empirical evidence on gender discrimination in the next section. Religion has also been shown to influence political institutions which, in turn, influence human development and economic policies. Empirical studies examining how religion shapes human development and economic policy-making therefore need to consider feedback effects via political institutions.
I investigate empirically the role of religion and political institutions on policies against human trafficking as measured by the new 3P Anti-trafficking Policy Index and its sub indices on prosecution, protection and prevention policies. As compared to Cho et al. (2013a) and Cho and Vadlamannati (2012) , I elaborate on how religion influences the 3P indices. I do not estimate panel data models but cross-sectional models, because the religion variables do not vary over time. A shortcoming of using cross-sectional data is, of course, to not exploit variation over time. I follow the related empirical literature by considering Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, and indigenous religions as the five major religion groups. My main focus is however on the difference between the two largest groups, Islam and Christianity. I elaborate on the types of religion on policies against human trafficking and not religion as such (vis-à-vis atheism) . For encompassing surveys on the consequences of religion and religiosity see, for example, Iannaccone (1998) .
Background

Religious doctrines
Religious doctrines do not appear to give rise to large differences in policies against human trafficking. Both Christian beliefs and Islamic law denounce human trafficking. Christian beliefs actually condemn human trafficking since it violates sexual morality and human dignity. Christians have been active in combating human trafficking (Zimmerman 2011) . Christian convictions shaped, for example, the moral sensibilities of the abolitionist movements in the 18th and 19th century. After the British Member of Parliament William Wilberforce converted to Christianity, he campaigned against slave trade. Consequently, the Slave Trade Act was passed in 1807 and the Slavery Abolition Act was passed in 1837. To be sure, Christians also held slaves and some Christians even justified the practice of slavery on supposed grounds of Christian theology (Zimmerman 2011: 570) . The social purity movements in the late 19th-and early 20th century and the religious freedom movements in the late 20th century constituted however a basis for the antitrafficking movements in the 21st century. Discussing the relationship between Christianity and anti-trafficking in the United States, Bernstein (2010: 66) arrives at the result: "two different shifts in feminist and conservative Christian sexual politics have made the contemporary campaign against sex trafficking possible: the feminist shift from a focus on bad men inside the home to bad men outside the home, and the shift of a new generation of evangelical Christians from a focus on sexually improper women (as prior concerns with abortion suggest) to a focus on sexually dangerous men."
The position of the UNODC (2010) report Combatting trafficking in persons in accordance with the principles of Islamic law is that "Islamic law, though it does not specifically prohibit trafficking in persons, explicitly prohibits many of the acts and elements that constitute trafficking in persons.
Islam is particularly explicit on the prohibition of slavery. Similarly, Islam prohibits sexual exploitation for profit" (UNODC 2010: 2).
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Islamic doctrine of consent needs to be distinguished from harmful customary practices such as female genital mutilation, forced feeding of women, son preference, early marriage etc. "Indeed, women and children are the targets of the most serious violations of human rights that occur in Muslim countries as a result of these harmful customary practices" (UNODC 2010: 28 f.). On human trafficking, especially women and children, in countries of the Middle East see Mattar (2002) . The small differences in religious doctrines between Christian tenets and Islamic law 5 Rubin (2011) elaborates on interest restrictions in Islam and Christianity and argues that underdevelopment in countries with Muslim majorities does not relate to Islam itself. deviate a great deal from empirical evidence on how, for example, gender equality is obeyed in countries with Christian and Muslim majorities.
Religion and human development
Religion has been shown to affect gender equality. Countries with Catholic majorities were among the first and have been more likely to ratify the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Gray et al. 2006) . Countries with Protestant majorities enjoyed, for example, gender equality in education (Becker and Woessmann 2008 , Norton and Tomal 2009 In countries with large Muslim populations, on the other hand, girls are discriminated in the education system (Norton and Tomal 2009, Cooray and Potrafke 2011 Branisa et al. 2009 ). The Islamic Al-Azhar's constitution has been shown to explicitly discriminate against women (Gouda 2013) . Discrimination is especially severe in the Middle East.
"Most governments in the Middle East have now formally endorsed, with reservations, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)… Yet the Arab Human Development Report documents that the region has some of the high rates of female illiteracy and the lowest rate of female labor force participation in the world. Women in the region encounter serious problems of basic health care, educational access, and income poverty, as well as suffering from exposure to violence, limited legal rights, and lack of access to justice" (Norris 2009a: 2) . Women in the Middle East are underrepresented in the workforce and in government. The discrimination against women notwithstanding, experts disagree whether it is oil 6 Countries with a high share of protestants have high income per capita and a high education level (e.g. Becker and Woessmann 2010, Hillman 2009: 524f., 535f.).
or Islam that drives gender inequality (Tripp 2009 , Charrad 2009 , Norris 2009b , Kang, 2009 , Caraway 2009 , Ross 2008 , 2009a , 2012a , and Groh and Rothschild 2012 .
The influence of religious creeds on gender equality is ambiguous: Seguino (2011) 
uses World
Value Surveys data and finds that no religion stands out as more gender-inequitable than others. Norris (2009a and and Guiso et al. (2003) who also use World Value Surveys data do however find that religion influences attitudes towards gender equality and that support for gender equality is lowest in countries with Muslim majorities.
A straightforward hypothesis is that discrimination against girls and women in countries with large Muslim populations is likely to exist in tandem with disregard for anti-trafficking policies.
The reason is that victims of human trafficking are usually women who are forced into prostitution (Di Tommaso et al. 2009 , Bettio and Nandi 2010 , Omar Mahmoud and Trebesch 2010 , Cho et al. 2013b , Nautz and Sauer 2008 . 
Religion and hierarchies between sexes
Islam has been described having a hierarchical and authoritarian character. Bennett (2010: 35) referring to Mawdudi's Purdah and the Status of Women in Islam which was first published in 1939 (2 nd edition in 1972) describes, for example, the relationship between men and women in Islam as follows: "Islam recognizes man as naturally stronger than women, so God raised men a "rank" above women for the latter's protection and maintenance, distinguishing their roles. Men are suited to lead, women to nurture. Consequently, their rights are similar but different (Qurán 7 Muslim dominated origin countries had low human trafficking outflows indicating that "female mobility is discouraged in Islamic countries which have presumably more conservative attitudes towards women" (Cho 2012: 18) . In a similar vein, the results by Rao and Presenti (2012) show that human trafficking is not more likely in countries with greater gender equality.
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Religion and political institutions also affect attitudes to child labor and the prevalence thereof. Maffei et al. (2006) find that more repressive political regimes are more permissive of child labor. On rights of the child and Convention on the Rights of the Child and Basic Immunization, see Gauri (2011 (Fadel 2012) .
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Catholicism also used to have a hierarchical and authoritarian character. Women, for example, are still not allowed to become priests. Guiso et al. (2003: 265 ff.) The model by Inglehart and Norris (2003) , Norris and Inglehart (2003) and Norris and Inglehart (2004) "suggests that long-standing religious traditions in each society have a deep and enduring impact upon contemporary social values and moral attitudes, including support for gender equality in politics, as well as shaping broader attitudes towards sexual liberalization" (Norris 2011: 6) .
Religion and political institutions
Religion has been shown to influence political institutions.
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Many empirical studies show that countries with Muslim majorities enjoy less freedom and are less democratic than countries in which Muslims are a minority (Lipset 1994; Midlarsky 1998; Barro 1999; Karatnycky 2002; Fish 9 Hillman (2004) has described Nietzschean behaviour as the strong being unconstrained by ethics in actions toward the weak. With women naturally physically weaker than men, women in Nietzschean societies are victims of male domination. 10 To be sure, Bennett (2010) does not hold the view that "Muslim women are equal but different" and shows for the Muslim countries Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan and Turkey that women served as state leaders promoting gender equality. 11 On Islamist feminism see Halverson and Way (2011) . 12 Facchini (2010) shows that Islam and institutions of freedom are negatively related. Coşgel et al. (2009) elaborate on the nexus between legal constraints and economic power of rulers in Islamic history. On economic performance in Islamic countries, see also Hillman (2007a) . For an overview of the relation between democracy and economic development, see Hillman (2007b). 2002; Ross 2001 Ross , 2009b Ross , 2012b Donno and Russett 2004; Borooah and Paldam 2007; Rowley and Smith 2009, Kalyvitis and Vlachaki 2012; Potrafke 2012 Potrafke , 2013 . Correspondingly, Voigt (2005) shows that the presence of Islam is inimical to property rightsprotection, the rule of law, and constitutional democracy. Timur Kuran's momentous studies show how Islam inhibited economic development (Kuran 1997 (Kuran , 2005 (Kuran and 2011 Kuran and Lustig 2012, Kuran and Singh 2013) . Islamic institutions that helped to delay economic modernization in the Middle East encompass many facets (Kuran 2011: 287ff.) . In Islam's first few decades, Kuran identifies the inheritance system, the acceptance of polygyny, the Ban on ribā, the absence of corporation, the choice of law limited to non-Muslims, the prohibition of apostasy, and the absence of merchant organizations. Institutions that delayed economic modernization have developed after Islam adopted the contract law, the waqfs, the court system, and capitulations. The Middle East's institutional history also curtails its present economic performance (Kuran 2011: 293 ff.). One obstacle to full modernization includes "political systems with low capacity for innovation and experimentation". Kuran (2011: 294) identifies "the weaknesses of private sectors and civil societies, which are rooted in the region's institutional history, breed complacency toward autocratic rule" as historical legacies. By contrast, the results by Woodberry (2012) show that conversionary Protestants promoted the rise of democracy a great deal. Attributes of democracy that conversionary Protestants initiated include: mass printing, newspapers, mass education, civil society and colonial rule of law.
Hypotheses
To investigate how religion influences anti-trafficking policies through political institutions, I adapt the theoretical framework of Berggren and Bjørnskov (2013) as illustrated in Figure 1 . groups, to which politicians respond. With different institutions reflecting social customs and attitudes to women, political decision making and the implementation of anti-trafficking policies thus differ across political systems. In democracies, politicians (the governing parties, members of parliament) will be more responsive to median voter attitudes in implementing anti-trafficking policies. In autocracies, dictators abide by the customs and follow the preferences of the elites that support the regime. Voters and politicians are likely to care about human trafficking not only because of moral issues and human right concerns, but also because human trafficking is associated with larger shadow economies and, as a consequence, more corruption and lower economic growth The "protection" sub index "assesses the level of governmental efforts to protect and assist the victims of human trafficking" (Cho et al. 2013a: 8) . The "prevention" sub index "evaluates the level of governmental efforts to prevent and combat human trafficking" (Cho et al. 2013a: 9) . I list the criteria for the three sub indices in Table A1 . The worldwide average score of the overall 3P index is 9.04. The worldwide average score of the prosecution sub index is 3.35, of the protection sub index 2.64 and of the prevention sub index 3.05. The level of compliance with the UN requirements thus differs across the three policy fields. These patterns show that "in terms of compliance with anti-trafficking policy, countries take the "justice and prevention" aspect of the crime more seriously, than the human rights aspect, as pointed out by Simmons and Lloyd (2010)" (Cho et al. 2013a: 10) . Table A2 shows the correlations between the overall 3P, and its sub indices on prosecution, protection and prevention policies.
Religion and democracy
I use the data on religious fractionalization by Parker (1997) . This database reports for each country over the percentage of the population belonging to the most widespread religions in the world. 
Correlations
To illustrate the association between anti-trafficking policies, religion and democracy, I first The correlations between the sub indices for prosecution, protection and prevention reveal similar patterns: the correlation between the religion variables is weakest with the prosecution sub index and strongest with the protection sub index. The correlation between the democracy variable is weakest with the prosecution sub index and strongest with the protection sub index. (2013a). The coefficient of the population size variable is statistically significant at the 1% level and has a positive sign. This estimate indicates that the overall 3P Index is in a given country by some 0.45 points higher than in an otherwise similar country if it has a 1% bigger population. The coefficients of the women's economic rights variable have the expected positive sign but do not turn out to be statistically significant. The coefficient of the OECD variable has the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at the 10% level in column (4). The CPI index measuring the absence of corruption has the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The estimate indicates that the overall 3P index is about 0.37 points higher when the CPI increases by one point (on a scale from 1 to 10), or that the overall 3P index is about 0.8 points higher when the CPI increases by one standard deviation. The finding that corruption mitigates anti-trafficking policies is also in line with the empirical findings by Cho et al. (2013a) . The oil production variable does not turn out to be statistically significant.
The empirical model
Results
Basic results
The results reported in Table 1 show that types of religion and political institutions have influenced anti-trafficking policies: democracies had stronger anti-trafficking policies than dictatorships. The coefficient of the democracy variable is statistically significant at the 1% level in column (1) and at the 10% level in columns (2) and (4). The coefficients of the Buddhists, Traditional Religions and other religion variables mostly do not turn out to be statistically significant (except the coefficient of the others variable in columns 2 and 3). The coefficient of the Hinduism variable is statistically significant at the 5% level in columns (1) and (2). The results in column (3) show however that the effect of the Hindus variable is driven by India. By contrast the coefficient of the Islam variable is statistically significant at the 5% level in column (1) and at the 1% level in columns (2) to (4). The coefficient has a negative sign which indicates that countries with Muslim majorities had less strict anti-trafficking policies than countries with Christian majorities (reference category). Because the results in columns (1) to (3) show that significant differences in policies against human trafficking only occur between countries with Christian and Muslim majorities, column (4) Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The marginal effects of the religion variables have to be interpreted conditionally on the interaction with the democracy variable (see Friedrich 1982) . 1 to 5) than in an otherwise identical but purely Muslim dictatorship. This marginal effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. Figure 10 shows the marginal effects of the Muslim share variable for the prevention sub index:
countries with Muslim majorities thus had significantly laxer prevention policies than countries with Christian majorities when the democracy variable assumes values smaller than 0.8. In pure dictatorships the prevention sub index decreased by about 0.007 points, when the share of Muslims increased by one point, implying that the prevention sub index in a dictatorship with no Muslims is by 0.7 points higher (on a scale from 1 to 5) than in an otherwise identical but purely Muslim dictatorship. This marginal effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. (4) Figure 10 . Marginal effect of the Muslim share as compared to Christian share. Conditioned on democracy. Effects refer to a model as in column (4) (4) 
Conditional Marginal Effects of Muslim share with 95% CIs
Why is it that religion influences the protection and the prevention sub indices, but does not influence the prosecution index? Cho and Vadlamannati (2012: 252f.) elaborate on strategic decisions governments undertake by adopting or not adopting strict anti-trafficking polices.
Governments are likely to select obligations with which they can comply with the lowest cost while satisfying the preferences of major powers in international politics such as the United States. As compared to protection and prevention policies, prosecution policy appears to be most costly to implement. For example, the obligations of prosecution require adopting the newly defined concept of human trafficking in national legislation. By contrast, the obligations of prevention policies do not require adopting new legislations, but rather include anti-trafficking public and media campaigns, and controlling borders, airports and train stations. While protection and prevention policies are less costly than prosecution policies, they may contradict with Islamic values.
"Protection policies mainly protect victims, while prosecution policies mainly target the perpetrators" (Cho et al. 2013a: 34) . In countries with Muslim majorities, protection appears to be very costly in a normative sense because it requires acknowledging human trafficking victims (including prostitutes) as victims and providing assistance for them. It is conceivable that Muslim dominated countries do not want to protect victims of human trafficking which are mostly women and receive expressive utility by not adopting protections and preventions policies (see Hillman 2010 on expressive behavior). These results perfectly correspond with, first, the empirical studies showing that women are discriminated in Muslim dominated countries and, second the study by Berggren and Bjørnskov (2013) showing that religion influences de facto enforcement but not necessarily de jure rules. Table 2 column (1) show that the religiosity variable does not turn out to be statistically significant, and the Muslim share variable remains statistically significant at the 10% level.
Robustness checks
One may well distinguish between Christian denominations such as Protestants and Catholics and also Sunni and Shia Muslims. I cannot distinguish between Sunni and Shia Muslims by using the data on religion by Parker (1997) and also not by using alternative data on religious fractionalization such as the data by Alesina et al (2003) . The category Muslim by Alesina et al. (2003) is for some countries subdivided in Shia Muslim and Sunni Muslim, for other countries this sub-division is not recorded. By using the data by Parker (1997) I can however distinguish between Protestants and Catholics. Columns (2) and (3) in Table 2 show results where I have used Catholics and Protestants as reference category: countries with Protestant and Catholic majorities did not implement significantly different policies against human trafficking. By contrast, the Muslim share variable remains statistically significant and indicates that countries with Muslim majorities pursued laxer anti-trafficking policies than both countries with Protestant and Catholic majorities.
I have used the revised combined POLITY IV index as alternative measure for political institutions. The revised combined POLITY IV index assumes values between -10 (pure dictatorship) and 10 (pure democracy). Column (4) in Table 2 Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
I have replaced the data on religion by Parker (1997) , which report the percentage of the population belonging to the most widespread religions, by religion dummy variables that take on the value one when a particular religion is dominant in a country. The information is from the CIA World Factbook (2013). The results show that the differences between countries with Christian and Muslim majorities are less pronounced as compared to the results using the religion data by Parker (1997).
I have also included the KOF indices of globalization (Dreher 2006, and Dreher et al. 2008) , which represent an attempt to measure globalization in the broad sense that has been accepted in the recent empirical literature. I have also included an index capturing the incidence of human trafficking into a country taken for the Index on Incidence of Reporting of Destination Countries provided by the UNODC Report. 20 The KOF index has frequently been used to measure globalization in recent empirical research on the influence of globalization on human development and economic policy-making (see, for example, Bergh and Nilsson 2010a, 2010b) . Globalization has influenced the empowerment of women. See, for example, Neumayer and de Soysa (2007 ), Cho (2012 and Dreher et al. (2012) .
The index assumes ordinal scores from 0 (no reported inflow of human trafficking) and 5 (very high inflows) and is used in related studies such as Cho et al. (2013b) . Including this index reduces the sample size to 147 countries and does not change the inferences regarding the types of religion variables at all.
The reported effects could also be driven or mitigated by idiosyncratic circumstances in individual countries. For this reason, I checked whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of particular countries. The results (not reported here) indicate that this is not the case. Future research needs to be done on how policies against human trafficking reduce trafficking as such. The sub-index on 'prosecution policy' measures the level of governments' efforts to punish and prosecute traffickers and other related offenders (such as employers of trafficking victims, law enforcement officials who collude with traffickers, and clients of services provided by human trafficking victims). The prime requirements for governments to implement are broken down into six areas: (i) the adoption of anti-trafficking law, (ii) the adoption of child trafficking law, (iii) the application of other relevant laws, (iv) the stringency of penalties, (v) the level of law enforcement, and (vi) the collection of crime statistics.
Conclusion
Protection:
The sub-index on 'protection policy' assesses the level of governmental efforts to protect and assist the victims of human trafficking. Nine prime requirements imposed by the Protocol (article 6, 7 and 8) are evaluated: (i) no punishment of victims, (ii) imposing no self-identification in order to prove their status as a victim; (iii) assistance for legal proceedings, (iv) the provision of residence permits, (v) basic services for housing, (vi) medical training, (vii) job training, (viii) assistance for rehabilitation and (ix) assistance for repatriation.
Prevention:
The index on 'prevention policy', evaluates the level of governmental efforts to prevent and combat human trafficking. Based on the requirements of the Protocol provided in article 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, seven areas are evaluated. Examples are the implementation of campaigns for antitrafficking awareness; training government and military officials (including peace keepers); facilitating information exchange among relevant authorities; monitoring borders, train stations, airports, etc.; adopting national action plans for combating trafficking in persons; promoting cooperation with NGOs and international organizations; and facilitating cooperation with other governments. Source: Cho et al. (2011: 7ff.) 
